Review: Ian Kershaw's The End

In his 2011 book The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944 - 1945 historian Ian Kershaw examines the last 10 months of World War II, from the botched assassination attempt on Hitler's life to the total surrender of the German army in May 1945.  Kershaw's thorough study is an attempt to answer the question why Hitler's Reich kept functioning to the bitter end, long after it was clear to his generals, and, indeed, to most of the population that the war was lost.

"A country defeated in war almost always at some point seeks terms. Self-destruction by continuing to fight on the last, down to almost total devastation and complete enemy occupation, is extremely rare.  Yet that is what the Germans did in 1945. Why?"

The answer to this question makes for very depressing reading. Not to criticize Kershaw, for he is an excellent historian and his study is comprehensive in its scope. What is depressing is the scale of death and destruction which was completely senseless and unnecessary.  In the ten months between July 1944 and May 1945 far more German civilians died than in the previous years of the war. primarily from the firebombing of German cities and the forced exodus from the eastern regions. Half the German servicemen killed in the entire war perished in these last 10 months (a total of 2.6 million out of 5.3 million deaths). Even as the Reich was collapsing around it the Nazi leadership intensified the deportation and systematic murder of Jews and other Untermenschen; millions were murdered in the last terrible months of the war. 

Kershaw explores many of the facets that kept the Nazi war and terror machine functioning smoothly long after its defeat was clear to even the most ardent fanatics.  Kershaw points to the structural weakness of Nazi governance, which was based on the charismatic leadership of the Führer. After the failed assassination attempt, the party became radicalized and set its domestic terror apparatus in motion to snuff out any dissenting or defeatist points of view.  No general would dare to criticize Hitler's conduct of the war, which would have disastrous consequences, particularly on the eastern front.  Kershaw also spends a great deal of time examining the activities of the quadrumvirate of Goermann, Goebbels, Himmler and Speer - three of which were the most brutal and radical fanatics - who were instrumental in continuing the lost war.  These key figures have been written about extensively by other historians.  Less well known were the Gauleiter - the regional Nazi Party chiefs who, increasingly, had free reign over their fiefdoms as communications with Berlin and the chain of command crumbled from the relentless aerial attacks and the advancing Allied forces.  Kershaw sheds much new light on their activities during the final months and days. 

Kershaw rejects the notion that the Allied demand for 'unconditional surrender' needlessly prolonged the war.  Britain and the United States in any case wanted to avoid a repeat of 1918 where a new German resistance could have organized around a "stabbed in the back" legend (Dolchstosslegende). In any event, the Allied demand of  unconditional surrender did not stop Stuffenberg and his co-conspirators from attempting a coup d'etat in July 1944.

Certainly fear of the Soviet Red Army played a key role in prolonging the fighting.  The Wehrmacht had no illusions as to what their fate would be under Soviet occupation, since the soldiers had witnessed or committed the worst atrocities on the Russian civilian population during the Operation Barbarossa.  The Nazi propaganda machine exploited the Soviet atrocities after the seizure of Nemmersdorf in East Prussia to good effect, instilling terror in the German population at the prospect of a Red Army invasion of the Reich. 

 Early on, Kershaw tells the story of the town of Ansbach.  With American troops at the gates of the town the local Nazi leader insists that the townspeople fight to the end.  A young theology student, Robert Limpert, seeks to intervene, wanting to avoid the senseless destruction of his beloved town.  He is denounced by members of the Hitler Youth, is brought before a farcical tribunal and sentenced to die.  He manages to escape briefly, but is captured and brought back by members of the community for execution.  He is hung just as American troops enter Ansbach.

Kershaw does a find job in his book explaining the actions of the Nazi leadership at all levels in those last terrible months of war.  What he doesn't explain - and perhaps it is impossible to explain - is the self-destructive behavior of the townspeople of Ansbach and of countless other communities.

Comments

[Steve]

"Kershaw rejects the notion that the Allied demand for 'unconditional surrender' needlessly prolonged the war. Britain and the United States in any case wanted to avoid a repeat of 1918 where a new German resistance could have organized around a "stabbed in the back" legend (Dolchstosslegende). In any event, the Allied demand of unconditional surrender did not stop Stuffenberg and his co-conspirators from attempting a coup d'etat in July 1944."

This is nonsense. Unconditional Surrender could not but prolong the war, as it was the least likely outcome to be achieved, and the one most likely to be strongly resisted, especially when coupled with proposals such as the Morgenthau Plan and Theodore Kaufman's Germany Must Perish!, both of which were given extensive propaganda coverage by Goebbels. Stauffenberg's attempt was doomed to failure largely because he was acting with little support, due to Unconditional Surrender especially, which was the chief obstacle to the German resistance forming an effective front, as had Churchill's earlier policy of no negotiation been.

You also neglect to mention that millions of German civilians died after the war ended, via further expulsions and oppression, as well as starvation, under an initially very harsh occupation and partition, the very thing many had feared. Conditions only improved when the former Allies fell out amongst themselves, and realised they needed the Germans as allies.

As for the 'unexplained self-destructive behavior', obviously many believed in the cause, for want of better knowledge at the time, and reinforced by what they saw and heard of Allied conduct.

[David]

Kershaw's book ends in May 1945 and does not deal with the aftermath.

There is zero evidence that Hitler would have considered a conditional surrender - on the contrary, he advocated "total warfare" after Normandy (Goering: "Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg?") It is absurd to blame the Allies for prolonging the war.

Again, suggest you read Kershaw before criticizing. He is a very, very thorough historian - and is recognized as such by his peers.

[Steve]

This is a complex topic which takes years of reading in both mainstream and less well-known sources to really understand. In fact Hitler was anxious for peace with Britain (the only then fully belligerent power) in 1940-41, and made numerous offers for it via both public and private channels, including offers to vacate most of the occupied nations to that point, in return of course for recognition of certain changes. The Hess mission was clearly tied in with this wish also. Regardless of what one thinks of Hitler's record to that point, the fact is that Churchill was the outright rejectionist even of preliminary negotiation (unless Britain's position became desperate). Once the war widened to include the USSR and US (which action he took partly because he saw no other option by that point, alternatives having been blocked by the Allies too), Hitler also became more hardline, however even in 1945 he and his circle still talked of the idea of a peace with the West against the USSR (see eg Goebbels diaries, also note that Goebbels said 'Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg not Goering - and AFTER the announcement of Unconditional Surrnder)). He had also said privately he would consider a deal with Stalin after a solid victory, eg at Kursk. But that is somewhat irrelevant to my main point, that Unconditional Surrender was a crippling obstacle to the German resistance to sidelining the Nazis and being willing to make peace on almost any half-decent terms for Germany, and this is amply documented. It is in fact absurd to excuse the Allies from prolonging the war, they absolutely did so in both theatres (they even rejected opportunities to kill Hitler when available), which again is amply documented.

I have Kershaw's Hitler bio, and whilst it is not bad, it is far from perfect, and he takes a lot for granted based on other secondary sources that is in fact highly dubious at times. Some of his peers can be even worse in this regard, the historiography of that period is highly flawed, as a number of less 'celebrated' though still respectable historians have shown.

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