Dialog International

Augstein: Appeasement of Putin a "Necessity"

Spiegel columnist Jakob Augstein once again tells his (mostly sympathetic) readers that Germany should not come come to the aid of the Ukrainians in the face of Russian aggression. Let's face it:  compared to the Bosnians, the people of the Ukraine just aren't worth any sacrifice on the part of the Germans: 

Gegenüber Serbien wäre Appeasement damals ein Verbrechen gewesen. Gegenüber Russland ist es heute eine Notwendigkeit. Wer dieses Wort nutzt, muss sich erklären. "Politik der Beschwichtigung", das ist ein verächtliches Schimpfwort, seit England und Frankreich Hitlers Griff erst nach dem Sudetenland, später der "Rest-Tschechei", duldeten. Nur, Geschichte wiederholt sich nicht, und Putin ist nicht Hitler.

(Appeasement towards Serbia would have been a crime; in the case of Russia today it's a necessity. Whoever uses this word needs to explain it. "Policy of appeasement" is a contemptible insult ever since England and France tolerated Hitler's seizure of the Sudetenland and later the remainder of Czechia.  However, history doesn't repeat itself and Putin is not Hitler.)

Later in the evening - right on cue- former chancellor Gerhard Schröder showed up in St. Petersburg to celebrate his 70th birtday with his old pal Vladimir Putin. 

Ukraine and the LImits of Diplomacy

The American historian and journalist Anne Applebaum exhorts German readers to learn the lessons of history: (Deustche, ihr müsst wieder Abschreckung lernen! - Germans, you have to learn the lessons of deterrence!)

Ms. Applebaum knows something about history - especially history of the Soviet Union.  Her history of Stalins network of Gulags - Gulag: A History - remains THE definitive work on the subject.   Her more recent book on postwar Eastern Europe - Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956 (see my review) - describes the origins and consolidation of Soviet domination of Poland, Hungary and East Germany.  

Here she praises Germany's skill at international diplomacy, but reminds readers that it wasn't Ostpolitik that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall; rather it was western military might:

Die Rote Armee wurde durch eine große Anzahl amerikanischer Soldaten, Waffen, Panzer und Nuklearwaffen abgeschreckt. Mit Diplomatie hatte das auch nichts mehr zu tun.

(The Red Army was deterred by a large number of American soldiers, weapons, tanks and nuclear weapons. Diplomacy had nothing to do with it. )

Putin is showing today that diplomacy is no deterrent to Russia's hegemonic goals in the Ukraine - and perhaps elsewhere:

Russland ist nicht nur am internationalen Recht nicht interessiert, Russland will es zerstören. Warum annektierte Putin die Krim, statt den Konflikt, so wie er es im Falle Abschasiens und Südossetiens tat, in einem Schwebezustand zu belassen?

Er tat so, weil er beweisen wollte, dass alle Regeln, nach denen Europa und besonders Deutschland in den letzten 60 Jahren lebten, nicht länger gelten. Er will das Vertrauen, das die Europäer in ihre Grenzen haben, destabilisieren. Er will, dass all die Pakte, Verträge und Vereinbarungen, die Europa nach 1945 und 1989 befriedeten, von uns selbst hinterfragt werden.

(Russia is not interested in international law.  Russia would rather destroy it. WHy did Putin annex Crimea rather than leaving the situation in an ambiguous position as in the case of Abhkazia and Ossetia?  He did it because he wanted to demonstrate that the old rules no longer apply.  He wanted to shake the trust that Europeans have in their borders.  He wants us to call into question all the pacts, agreements, and contracts which have kept Europe peaceful after 1945.) 

Will Germany defend NATO and the institutions that brough it peace and prosperity for 60 years?

Alle europäischen Institutionen haben Deutschland in den letzten 60 Jahren Frieden und außergewöhnlichen Wohlstand gebracht. Will Deutschland dies alles verteidigen, braucht es nun doch mehr als nur Diplomatie.

(Europe's institutions have brought Germany peace and extraordinary prosperity for the last 60 years. If Germany wants to defend this, it will require more than diplomacy.)

Judging from the reader comments to Ms. Applebaum's piece, her words are falling on deaf ears. Here is a typical - and disheartening - comment:

Gute Beziehungen zu Russland sind für Deutschland wichtiger als die Ukraine, die EU oder die Beziehungen zu den USA.
Die USA sind nur noch eine Besatzungsmacht welche Deutschland für die eigenen Interessen missbraucht.Dementsprechendist nicht Russland der feind sondern mittlerweile die USA , der Feind im eigenen Land.

(Good relations with Russia are more important that the Ukraine, EU or relations with the US.  The US is nothing but an occupation force which misuses Germany for its own interests.  For this reason Russia is not the enemy but rather in the meantime the US - the enemy in our own country.)

'There is a new word that keeps cropping up in the German press these days: Entwestlichung = de-westernization.   It does seem very appropriate. 

Anti-Americanism and Geman Public Support for Putin

It is hard to understand what is going on in Germany.  The Ukraine is in an existential crisis as it tries to pivot to the democratic values of the West, but the majority of Germans seem drawn to Putin's authoritarian Machtpolitik.

A majority of Germans, according to two recent opinion polls, are opposed to significant new sanctions. In addition, one poll suggests that a majority of Germans sympathize with Putin’s desire to protect Russian national interests in Crimea.

At the same time, profound skepticism of the United States after spying revelations by Edward Snowden last year has added to the pressure here. For a vocal minority, the breach of trust exposed by U.S. eavesdropping on the German leader has cast doubt on any initiative advocated by Washington.

“A positive image of Russia has grown in Germany, which is a mixture of culturalism and admiration of Putin as the strong man standing up against the U.S.,” said Stefan Meister, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Edward Snowden is worshiped by both the Left and Right in Germany, even after he appeared on Putin's call-in show yesterday in Moscow, revealing himself as Putin's Lord Haw-Haw. 

What is behind this admiration of Putin?  Is it a longing for the decisive "strong leader" who thumbs his nose at the messy process of democratic governance?  This how Spiegel columnist Jan Fleischhauer sees it: ("Warum viele Deutsche Putin bewundern").  I suspect they applaud Putin for his defiance of the United States.  Many Germans believe the CIA is behind the unrest in the Ukraine, as if the Ukrainian people have no agency in their own fate.  Yes, Putin imprisons his political opponents, has journalists who report on corruption murdered, and has his thugs brutally beat gays and lesbians on the street. But Obama is much worse because of the NSA! Putin, as he assured Edward Snowden in his call-in propoganda-extravaganza, would NEVER spy on the Russian people - much less listen in on the German chancellor's cell phone.  

Admiration for Putin is the flip-side of German contempt for the United States.  The journalist Sebastian Fischer gets to the heart of the issue: 

Es sind antiamerikanische Reflexe, die sich da zeigen. Nur 45 Prozent der Deutschen sehen laut ARD-Deutschlandtrend vom April den Platz Deutschlands "fest im westlichen Bündnis", 49 Prozent dagegen wünschen sich eine "mittlere Position" zwischen dem Westen und Russland. Dass hier eine Mehrheit die Westbindung zur Disposition stellt, die Deutschland Freiheit und Demokratie gebracht hat - also das, was sich andere Völker revolutionär erkämpfen mussten - das ist verstörend.

(Anti-American relexes are manifesting themselves. According to a poll conducted by ARD in April, only 45% of Germans see Germany's place as "securely in the western alliance", while 49% prefer a "middle position" between the west and Russia. The fact that a majority here question the connection to the west, which has brought freedom and democracy to Germany - something that other people are striving for through revolutionary means - that is very disturbing.)

Perplexing.  The Poles, the Czechs, the Lithuanians, the Estonians - they all lived for decades under Soviet Russian rule and are under no illusions concerning Putin's goals.  Only the Germans, a sizable percentage of whom experienced the same oppression for 40 years, are sympathetic to Putin.

 

Boston - "Die starke Stadt"

Sebastian Fischer has a nice piece in Der Spiegel marking the one year anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombing:

"Boston Strong" war das Motto dieser Tage. Statt den Ort der Tragödie zu verlassen, blieben viele der Marathonläufer in der Stadt, demonstrierten ihren Widerstandsgeist, spendeten Blut für die Verletzten; Tausende hielten Mahnwache für Martin Richard, den Jungen mit dem Peace-Plakat; Tausende säumten die Straßen, als US-Präsident Barack Obama zum Gedenkgottesdienst kam; Zehntausende besuchten das nächste Heimspiel der Baseball-Mannschaft Red Sox. "Die guten Menschen von Boston", sagte Obama damals (Sehen Sie hier ein Video aus der Zeit).

(Boston Strong was the motto for these days. Instead of leaving the place where the tragedy happened, many marathon runnvers remained in the city, demsontrated their spirit of resistance and donated blood for the injured.  Thousands held a candellight vigil for Martin Richard, the boy with the peace poster; thousands ringed the streets when Presiden Barack Obama came to the memorial service; tens of thousands attended the next home game of the Boston Red Sox. "The good people of Boston," Obama said then.)

Just as the bombs exploded at the Marathon finish line, my wife and I were on a train pulling into North Station (my wife was to attend a conference in Boston).  We arrived at scene of panic and chaos, since there were false reports of bombs going off across the city.  Many were streaming into the station, anxious to leave Boston, and we also thought about turning around and getting on the next train out of town. But we decided to stay, and thus experienced the next traumatic days as the people of Boston coped with the tragedy.  At our hotel we encountered marathon runners from Italy, Ireland and Australia, dazed and amazed by what they had just experienced.  The next couple of days everyone went about their business - there was a sense of fear everywhere, especially in the subway, since we knew the bombers were among us and may strike again.  Tensions continued to mount over the next few days as the news media - led by CNN - came out with mistaken reports that the terrorists had been captured.  FInally, things came to a climax four days after the bombing with the bloody shootout and capture of of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.

What has happened in Boston over the past twelve months has been truly amazing.  The city came together to embrace the doqens of victims and help them heal from the terrible wounds - both physical and emotional. 

We are getting close to the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Sebastian Fischer makes a good point about the citizens of Boston: 

Gut vier Monate wird der Zarnajew-Prozess dauern, bis zu hundert Zeugen sollen gehört werden. Die insgesamt 30 Anklagepunkte umfassen unter anderem den Vorwurf des vierfachen Mordes und des Einsatzes von Massenvernichtungswaffen. Dennoch scheint eine lebenslange Haftstrafe für Zarnajew wahrscheinlicher als die Todesstrafe: Denn das Urteil müssen am Ende Geschworene fällen. Und wenn die Mehrheitsmeinung der Bevölkerung von Massachusetts ein Anhaltspunkt sein kann, dann dürfte der Angeklagte mit dem Leben davonkommen.

(The Tsarnaev trial is expected to last at least four months, up to one hundred witnesses will testify. The 30 criminal charges include among other thing four counts of murder and the use of weapons of mass destruction.  Even so, life imprisonment is a more likely sentence than the death penalty:  for the verdict must be reached by a jury, and if the majority opinion of the people of Massachusetts is any indication, then the accused's life will be spared.)

Boston, city of great universities and enlightenment, the center of the abolitionist movement, last put a citizen to death in 1947.  The last thing Boston wants to do is respond to this tragedy with another killing.

The reslience of optimism.

Historical Revisionism Today: "Things weren't so bad in the GDR."

Nearly 25 years after the collapse of the "Deutsche Demokratische Republik" some high-school history teachers are telling their students ""Es war nicht alles schlecht in der DDR". Dictatorships, they teach, are not so bad - as long as you "play by the rules".

Sound incredible?  That is the experience of the writer Roman Grafe, who has been visiting high schools around Germany and telling students about the total repression of freedom in the former East Germany.  Often, these talks elicit hostile reactions from the faculty.  At the Comenius-Schule in Stendal a "history teacher" lashed out at Grafe:

"Ich habe mich wohlgefühlt in der DDR", .... Und Sie haben heute die DDR schlechtgemacht. Wenn man sich in Diktaturen an die Regeln hält, passiert einem nichts. Ich frage mich, warum Sie wieder hergekommen sind, wenn Sie Stendal nur schlechtmachen."

("Life was good in the GDR... And you come here today to denigrate the GDR. Nothing can happen to you in a dictatorship if you play by the rules.  I really wonder why you came if you just want to say bad things about Stendal.")

At another school he was told by a "history teacher":

 "Ich habe eine andere Meinung über die DDR als Sie. Ich habe direkt am Grenzzaun gewohnt, mich hat der Zaun nicht gestört. Wir konnten nach Ungarn und Bulgarien reisen, das hat uns genügt."

("I have different opinion than you about the GDR. I lived next to the border fence- it never once bothered me. We could travel to Hungary or Bulgaria- that was plenty for us.")

Comments like this are made openly to a vistor to the schools. But what are teachers telling their students when no outsiders are around?  What are students learning about recent history?  And could this Ostalgie (nostalgia for the old East Germany) result in hostility or plain indifference to democratic principles?